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"The people shall dwell alone"*:
The Effect of Transfrontier Broadcasting on Freedom
of Speech and Information in Israel
Amit M. Schejtert
ABSTRACT
The regulation of transfrontier broadcasting in Israel has
served a system of information and cultural control motivated by a
nationalistic-protectionist ideology ever since the 1960s.
Although the policies regulating Israeli broadcasting have at times
shown greater openness to Western values and international
influences, this article demonstrates through an analysis of legal
documents how regulators have reverted in recent years to a more
restrictive policy regarding the free flow of transborder
communications. This reversion has occurred in a changing
technological world combining new cultural goals with "old
school" fear of propaganda.
For decades, lawmakers and
regulators have been devising and re-devising ways to prevent
foreign channels from broadcasting in Israel. At first such actions
were attempts to avoid the influence of hostile propaganda and
later were efforts to protect heavily regulated government licensed
channels, whose remit serves the government's ideology. Using a
critical interpretive methodology, the study describes and analyzes
the evolution of Israeli regulatory policy over the past four
decades.
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I. Introduction
When the Moabite prophet Balak stood overlooking the
encampment of the Israelites about to enter Canaan some threeand-a-half millennia ago, he observed that they were a people
dwelling alone, and he blessed them for being such.'
Technological advances of media since then and the wide
acceptance that the free flow of information benefits society raise
the question whether the heirs of the ancient Israelites can
continue striving to dwell alone.
A. Television in Service of National Goals
To what extent television shapes public opinion has yet to be
fully ascertained. Nonetheless, governments tend to attribute a
powerful effect to this medium and treat it accordingly. 2 In
developing nations, this concept of the-power of television has led
governments to assign it roles in national development and to

I Numbers 23:9.
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maintain controls over its content.' Transfrontier broadcasting
may weaken these controls by introducing unplanned messages
into systems rooted in strong ideological convictions and at times
meticulously planned.4 The introduction of digital multi-channel
platforms distributed by both cable and satellite has created the
potential for more foreign channels to be offered to subscribers.
This technological change offers new challenges to regulatory
systems bent on maintaining old controls.
A case in point is Israel, a developing nation often described as
a free country, where political rights and civil liberties receive
high marks.5 Over the past forty years, however, Israel has
maintained strict controls over its broadcast media and has been
embroiled in an ongoing struggle with outside intruders it fears
might undermine its communications and information program.
An analysis of three recent decisions by the Israeli Supreme Court,
Media Most v. Cable & Satellite Council,6 Musawa Ctr. for the
Rights of Arab Citizens of Isr. v. Prime Minister,7 and Kirsch v.
Chief of Staff of the Israeli Def. Forces,8 demonstrates to what
extent control of news and programming are ingrained in the
system. In addition, they show that the traditional motives
influencing Israeli media policy-a fear of external propaganda
and a desire for social uniformity-remain intact as the underlying
motivation for media regulation. The fear of external propaganda
manifests itself in the control of news, and the desire for social
uniformity manifests itself in the high government involvement in
programming decisions. A byproduct of all this has been the
marginalization of the Palestinian minority living within Israel and
its depiction as a "fifth column." More than anything else,
3 See ELIHU KATZ & GEORGE WEDELL, BROADCASTING IN THE THIRD WORLD
(1977).
4 Amos Owen Thomas, Regulating Access to Transnational Satellite Television:
Shifting Government Policies in NortheastAsia, 61 GAZETTE 243 (1999).
5 See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

(2005).
6 HCJ 6962/03, 10338/03 [2004] (unpublished decision on file with author),
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/03/620/069/v15/03069620.v 5.pdf.
7 HCJ 375/03 [2004] (unpublished decision on file with author),
http://elyon 1.court.gov.il/files/03/750/003/108/03003750.108.pdf.
8 HCJ 2753/03, 2791/03 [2003] (unpublished decision on file with author),
http://elyon 1.court.gov.il/files/03/530/027/109/03027530.109.pdf.
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perhaps, this outcome demonstrates the extent of the harmful
effects of policies aimed at closing a society.
B. How TransborderTelevision May Destabilizea
"Planned" Order
This study identifies three arenas in which transborder
broadcasting may interfere with national planning by Israeli
regulators. Two are specifically content-based: news and culture.
The third is more market-structure based: advertising. However,
all three are intertwined, and ultimately their regulation serves the
same goals.
Control of news flow, often associated with government
propaganda efforts, is not a practice undertaken exclusively by
undemocratic or totalitarian regimes-Israel being a prime
example. Control takes place through a variety of techniques
ranging from censorship that limits information flow to
sophisticated public relations efforts aimed at framing the news in
a "positive" manner.9
News from across the borders can
potentially undermine the public's trust in information controlled
by government sources; such news often prompts government
controls.
Governments, however, do not limit the regulation of
information flow to limitations set on "hard news."' The media
are often assigned the role of integrating national culture in
developing nations," or, alternatively, preserving national values
in more mature societies. 12 The media aid governments in creating
a cultural code or "national identity,"' 3 and even in mature
societies they help perpetuate the existing cultural status quo by
supporting the conservative-capitalist hegemony, 4 adhering to
9 See, e.g., Ray E. Hiebert, Public Relations and Propagandain Framing the Iraq
War: A PreliminaryReview, 29 PUB. REL. REV. 243 (2003).
10 See Michael Schudson, Culture and the Integration of NationalSocieties in THE
SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE 21 (Diana Crane, ed., 1994).
11
12

Id.
See Jay G. Blumler,

TELEVISION

AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: VULNERABLE

VALUES IN WESTERN EUROPEAN BROADCASTING (1992).

13 See John Hartley, Television, Nation, and Indigenous News, 5 TV & NEWS
MEDIA 7 (2004).
14 See generally TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN
THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE LEFT (1980).
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strict content regulations,15 and supporting the production of
indigenous content. 6
The introduction of commercial media in countries formerly
dominated by a national or public broadcaster may also interfere
with a government's cultural agenda in broadcasting. This is
largely due to the fact that transnational corporations own many
commercial media sources. 7
While these externally owned
broadcasters could be subject to control if they were licensed in
the country where their broadcasts are received, the intrusion of
unregulated transborder broadcasting thus has the potential of
undermining government efforts in this arena.
Israel is unique among nations thought to espouse freedom of
speech and other civil liberties. First, it has been in a constant
state of conflict with at least some of its neighboring nations for
more than fifty years.
Second, it actively promotes the
absorption of large numbers of immigrants. 9
These unique
attributes render it virtually impossible to compare Israel with
countries with otherwise similar legal and communications
systems. Hence, although a type of transfrontier broadcasting
discussed in this paper-the practice of circumventing national
broadcasting laws by stationing a broadcaster beyond national
borders of its targeted audience and financing its broadcasts
through local advertising-has existed in Europe for at least three
decades, it defies comparison with Israel. 20 Because a comparison
of policies would be hard to justify methodologically, this paper
focuses on Israeli policies and describes Western European
policies briefly for the sake of providing context.
15 For example, growing indecency standards.
16 For example, in the neo-liberal regime of New Zealand.

See Avril Bell, An
EndangeredSpecies: Local Programming in the New Zealand Programming Market, 17
MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC'Y 181 (1995).

17 See generally Herbert Schiller, Transnational Media: Creating Consumers
Worldwide, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 47 (1993).
18 See generally BEN-YEHUDA, HEMDA & SHMUEL SANDLER, THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT TRANSFORMED: FIFTY YEARS OF INTERSTATE AND ETHNIC CRISES (State Univ.

of New York 2002).
19 Allan C. Brownfeld, Israel's Aggressive Promotion of Aliyah a Rejection of
Jewish Life Outside Israel, THE WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS 72
(Nov. 2004).
20 See infra section 1.D.
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C. Regulating Israeli Media: Open or Closed?
Although it lacks a formal constitution, Israel has been
awarded high grades in international comparative studies of
political rights and civil liberties. 2' However, beneath this facade
lies a system bent on restricting the rules of freedom of
information, freedom of the press and, in particular, freedom of
broadcasting. Electronic media in Israel are governed by a
plethora of regulators: public broadcasting is overseen by the
Israel Broadcasting Authority 22 ("IBA"); commercial over-the-air
broadcasting is regulated by the Second Authority for Television
and Radio; 23 and cable and satellite services are administered by
the Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Council 24 (the "Cable
Council"), all politically appointed bodies that maintain strong ties
with the political apparatus.
Lacking a constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, Israel
adopted the principle of freedom of speech through judicial
interpretation. 2' The Israeli Supreme Court has often cited this
principle and implemented it while defending hate speech on2 8
27
television, 2 6 commercial speech on both radio and television, 29
speech for perceived enemies of the state on public broadcasting,
and speech in reporting on wrongdoings in the security forces.3 °
At the same time, however, Israel still maintains severe
restrictions on media, both print and electronic. The publication of
a newspaper requires a license 3' and Article 19 of the Press
Ordinance authorizes the Minister of the Interior to shut down
21 Freedom House, supra note 5.
22 Broadcasting Authority Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI 103, art. 3 (1964-1965) (Isr).
23 The Second Authority for Radio & Television Law, 1990, S.H. 59.
24 The Telecommunications (amend. 4) Law, 1986, S.H. 224.
25 HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am v. Minister of the Interior [1953] IsrSC 7(2) 871, 876.
26 HCJ 399/85 Kahane v. IBA [1987] IsrSC 41(3) 255, 281.
27

HCJ 606/93 Kidum Entrepreneurship & Publ'g Ltd. v. IBA [1994] IsrSC 48(2)

1, 17.
HCJ 5118/95 Mayo Simon Mktg & PR Ltd. v. Second Auth. for Radio &
Television [1996] IsrSC 49(5) 751, 757.
29 See HCJ 243/82 Zichroni v. IBA [1983] IsrSC 37(1) 757.
28

30 See, e.g., HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor [1989] IsrSC 42(4)
617.
31 Press ordinance, 1933, Palestine Gazette, 56.
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unlicensed newspapers.3 2 This ordinance has been widely used
even years after it was limited in scope,3 3 particularly against
newspapers serving Palestinians that reside within Israel. The
Supreme Court has on occasion approved the practice, 34 as well as
use of the Defence Regulations, which grant the authorities similar
powers to take sanctions against the media3 5 while citing the
limitations on government power to restrict freedom of the press.3 6
News can only be broadcast through government-controlled public
broadcasting, 37 government-supervised news corporations in
which government-appointed officials sit on the board of
directors, 38 or through two types of government-licensed channels
awarded in competitive tenders on the cable platform, neither of
39
which exist.
Both broadcast and cable television in Israel have been
assigned numerous cultural obligations that reflect the needs of
different interest groups who enjoy positions of power within
society. 4 0 These cultural obligations reflect a desire by the
government to create a melting pot in which the dominant culture

32 Id.

33 See HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am v. Minister of the Interior [1953] IsrSC 7(2) 871, 876.
34 See, e.g., HCJ 644/81 Omar Int'l, Inc. v. Minister of the Interior [1982] IsrSC
36(1) 227.
35 Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945), 1945, Palestine Gazette, 855.
36 See, e.g., HCJ 541/83 Ash v. Superintendent of Jerusalem [1983] IsrSC 37(4)
837.
37 Broadcasting Authority Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI 103, art.3 (1964-1965) (Isr).
38 The Second Authority for Radio & Television Law, 1990, S.H. 59, arts. 63-71.
Note that the government-supervised news corporations are a branch of commercial
media, not of public broadcasting.
39 This can be done by one of two mechanisms: a "thematic channel" under Article
47 of the Telecommunications Law, 2001 or a "news channel" under Article I of the
Law to Boost Economic Growth, Employment and Achieve the Goals of the National
Budget, 1998. See also Amit Schejter, Less News Is Good News: Fifty Years of
Communication Policy in a Volatile Democracy, a paper presented at the 27th
Telecommunication Policy Research Conference (TPRC), Alexandria, Va. (Sept. 1999)
(discussing the limitations of broadcast news in Israel).
40 See Amit Schejter, The Cultural Obligations of Broadcast Television in Israel,
56 GAZEI-rE 183 (2000) [hereinafter Schejter, Cultural Obligations in Broadcast];Amit
Schejter, From a Tool for National Cohesion to a Manifestation of National Conflict:
The Evolution of Cable Television Policy in Israel, 1986-98, 4 COMM. L. & POL'Y 177,
177-200 (1999) [hereinafter Schejter, Evolution of Cable TV Policy in Israel].
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would be nurtured at the expense of the indigenous cultures of
immigrant groups. This goal is achieved through the detailed
cultural obligations prescribed by law,41 license requirements,42 or
rules of government-initiated tenders when new cable channels are
established. 3
D. TransborderBroadcastingin European Law
The practice of financing transfrontier broadcasting through
advertising has existed in Europe for at least three decades.4 As
of January 2004, there were 218 channels in Europe originating in
one country and targeting others with 162 of those channels
targeting specific countries.45 The economic impact of crossborder television, however, is virtually impossible to assess, as
neither the broadcasters nor their competitors supply, or even
maintain, records that distinguish between the local and crossborder ends of the business. 46 This enonnous scope of activity
may explain why the most comprehensive jurisprudence on the
matter was developed in Europe, where the ideology of "television
without frontiers," dictated by the European Union, was not
always welcome by national legislation. Indeed, the Television
Without Frontiers Directive 7 is often cited for its role in
safeguarding European culture against American cultural
imperialism, but it has nonetheless influenced the flow of audiovisual content between Member States as well. a8 Responding to
41 This is the case in both public and commercial over-the-air broadcasting.
42 The Telecommunications Law (amend. 25), 2001, S.H. 530.
43 Id. art. 47.
44 George Wedell & Andre Lang, Regulatory and FinancialIssues in Transfrontier
Television in Europe, in BROADCASTING FINANCE IN TRANSITION 382, 387 (Jay G.
Blumler & T.J. Nossiter eds., 1991).
45 TRANSFRONTIER TELEVISION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: MARKET IMPACT AND

SELECTED LEGAL ASPECTS 6 (Mar. 2004), http://www.obs.coe.int/online-publication

/transfrontiertv.pdf.
46 Id. at 13.

47 Council
provisions laid
concerning the
Directive 97/36

Directive 89/552, 1989 O.J. (L 298) (EC) (on the coordination of certain
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States
pursuit of television broadcasting activities) amended by Council
1997 O.J. (L 202) (EC).

48 See, e.g., Joe Middleton, The Effect of Audiovisual Regulation Inside the
European Union: The Television Without Frontiers Directive and
Protectionism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 607, 607-27 (2003).
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the fear of American media influence, the Directive has created a
quota system that ensures a minimum level of original European
content on European channels.49 However, with regard to the flow
of content across European borders, the Directive advocates
openness and minimal cross-border constraints as it established
that Member States could not restrict re-transmission of television
signals from other Member States5" except within a closed list of
forbidden broadcasts that include broadcasts harmful to minors5
or broadcasts that incite hatred.52
In at least two cases, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities was asked to decide whether transfrontier
broadcasting could be blocked by the receiving state. In TVIO SA
v. Commissariaatvoor de Media53-a case that discusses a ban on
a channel aimed at the Netherlands-the Court references a
national court holding, which states:
[a] Member State cannot be denied the right to take measures to
prevent the exercise by a person providing services whose
activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of
the freedom guaranteed by [the Treaty] for the purpose of
avoiding the [rules] which would be applicable to him if he were
established within that State.54
Under these circumstances, the fact that the broadcast was a
transborder broadcast was not deemed relevant, since at the heart
of the decision lay the issue of circumvention, and the outcome
would have been no different had the broadcaster been Dutch.55
A different case involving this issue emerged with VT4, a
Flemish language channel owned by Scandinavian shareholders
and incorporated and licensed in the United Kingdom as a non-

49 Council Directive 89/552, supra note 47, art. 4.
50 Article 2 in the original version of the Directive; Article 2a in the amended
version.
51 Council Directive 89/552, supra note 47, art. 22
52 Council Directive 89/552, supra note 47, art. 22a (added in 1997).
53 Case C-23/93, TV10 SA v. Commissariaat voor de media, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4795,
1995 2 C.M.L.R. 284.
54 Id. (citing Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur Van De Bedrijfsvereniging
Voor De Metaalni-jverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, 1975 1 C.M.L.R. 299).
55 See G. Staetmans & C. Goemans, Case Law: TVIO v. Commissariaatvoor de
Media (C-23193), I COLUM. J. EUR. L. 319, 325 (1995).
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domestic satellite service.56 The Flemish Minister for Culture and
Brussels Affairs refused to allow the VT4 television channel to
have access to the cable distribution network in Belgium.5 7 He did
this because of a monopoly on Flemish language broadcasting
required by law at that time, and because he regarded VT4 as a
Flemish entity trying to circumvent Flemish law.58 The European
Court of Justice sided with VT4, ruling that it was indeed a British
entity, and that no justification existed under Article 2 of the
Television Without Frontiers Directive to block VT4's signal from
being re-transmitted on Belgian soil.5 9
How can the contradiction between the two decisions be
explained? It seems that one possible explanation lies in the
motivation behind the ban on the re-transmission. While the
Dutch rule was made because TV1O threatened a rule aimed at
protecting the pluralism of Dutch broadcasting, the Belgian court
initially ruled against VT4 in order to safeguard a monopoly of a
single Flemish language commercial broadcaster in Belgium.6 °
In a third case, the criminal case of Paul Denuit, 6' brought
before the European Court of Justice, the mere fact that the
"circumvention" attempted by a British-based company whose
feed was retransmitted into Belgium was the result of different
standards used to apply the TVWF Directive, was not seen as a
justification to ban the broadcast. 62 Hence, the standard set by the
European Court was that the justification for the ban within the
receiving market was very limited, and interpretation-let alone
implementation of cultural decisions-was not seen as sufficient
justification.63 In other cases, even avoidance of a tax as
56 Case C-56/96, VT4 Ltd. v. Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 1997 E.C.R., 1997 3
C.M.L.R. 1225.

57 Id. at 1-3148.
58 Id. at 1-3148.
59 Id. at 1-3154-3158.

60 See Press Release, European Commission, European Commission Requests
Flemish Government to End VTM Advertising Monopoly (June 26, 1999),
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/97/569&format=HTML&a
ged=O&Ianguage=EN&guiLanguage=en.
61 Case C-14/96, Criminal Proceedings Against Paul Denuit, [1997] E.C.R. 1-2785.
62 Id.at 23.

63 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstryelsen, 1999 ECR I1459; 1999 2 C.M.L.R. 551.
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justification for "circumvention"

was rendered a legitimate

construct in light of the goals of a common European community.
In the words of Centros Ltd.:
the fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a
company chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of
company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up
branches in other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an
abuse of the right of establishment. 64
The TVIO, Paul Denuit, and VT4 decisions were made before

the TVWF Directive was amended in 1997. The 1997 amendment
adopted in principle the different court decisions regarding its
interpretation prior to the revision, and set a stricter standard that
limited Member States' capability to block transfrontier broadcasts
thereon. 65 The 1997 amendment in recital 14 states that:
[t]he Court of Justice has constantly held that a Member State
retains the right to take measures against a television
broadcasting organization that is established in another Member
State but directs all or most of its activity to the territory of the
first Member State if the choice of establishment was made with
a view to evading the legislation that would have applied to the
organization had it been established on the territory of the first
Member State.66

Thus, "circumvention" as a justification for banning retransmission has been "vindicated," even in Europe, where the
"without frontiers" ethos is fundamental.67
The limited
jurisprudence that exists regarding this subject suggests that it is
only possible to uphold this standard on the rare occasions when it

supports the underlying philosophy of pan-European legislation,
which is to maintain a competitive and varied market.

E. The Plan of the Study
The preceding overview of media law in Israel emphasizes
64

Id. at 1-1493.

O.J. (L 202) 14 (EC) (amending Council
Directive 89/552 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation
or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television
broadcasting activities).
66 Id.
65 Council Directive 97/36, 1997

67 Mark Wheeler, SupranationalRegulation: Television and the European Union,
19 EUR. J. OF COMM. 349, 351-52 (2004).
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elements of government control and sets the background for
comparison with the European standards of regulating transborder
broadcasts.
The main part of this study describes specific
regulation of transborder broadcasts discussed in recent Israeli
Supreme Court decisions and demonstrates that these decisions are
effectively new takes on old policies. The study begins with a
discussion of the control of news flow in times of war and is
followed by a discussion on the targeting of national audiences
with local transfrontier channels whose original target audience
are the citizens of neighboring countries. It continues with a look
at the protection enjoyed by government-sanctioned channels
delegated with a cultural mission of immigrant absorption. The
study concludes with a discussion of transborder information flow
policy and an analysis of whether it can be justified within the
underlying assumptions on which the Israeli legal system is based.
This final analysis uses Frank Fischer's four stages for critical
analysis of public policy: describing the program, questioning the
program's success, identifying the program's belief system, and
testing the legitimacy of the program and the belief system in the
present social order.68
II. The Cases
A. Media as a Controlledand Closed System: From the
Launch of Television to the Iraq War
1. The Launching of Public and Commercial Over the
Air Broadcasting
Fear of a negative effect from transfrontier broadcasts
motivated the creation of a television service in Israel and
continues to influence many decisions pertaining to the
development of television broadcasting. This was demonstrated
most recently in the Cable Council decisions regarding the retransmission of CNN 69 and BBC World,7° and in the Supreme
68 See generally FRANK FISCHER, POLITICS, VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE

(1980).
69 Council decision of Aug. 1, 2002, http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/
council I/dec 11 .8.02.pdf.
70 Council decision of Apr. 3, 2003, http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/
PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY
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Court's decision in the Kirsch7 case.
Television broadcasts launched in Israel for the first time in
1968 after an extended consultation process with international and
local committees who convinced the Israeli government that a
television service could serve its national goals.72 The stated goal
of this venture was to reduce the destructive cultural and political
influence of foreign television, with the premise that the less
educated the people, the more vulnerable the population, and
consequently the greater the inclination to watch television and be
affected by its content.73
In addition to its national- and cultural-protectionist missions,
Israeli television, particularly its broadcasts in Arabic, was meant
to serve as a propaganda and information tool for Arabic-speaking
audiences in both Israel and neighboring countries.7 4 In fact, the
eventual decision to create a television service immediately after
the June 1967 war75-a war that ended with the occupation of
neighboring territories and eventual installation of military rule
over the vast Palestinian population within those territories-was
based on a need to communicate to the Palestinian inhabitants of
the occupied territories.76

Throughout the period of escalating tensions that led up to the
June 1967 war, many Israeli Jews were tuned in to the "Voice of
the United Arab Republic," which broadcast false information
from Cairo in Hebrew with the explicit purpose of demoralizing

council 1/dec)l 3.4.03.pdf.
71 HCJ 2753/03, 2791/03 Kirsch v. Chief of Staff of the Israeli Def. Forces [2003]
(unpublished decision on file with author), http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files/03/530
/027/109/03027530.109.pdf.
72 See Schejter, Cultural Obligations in Broadcast, supra note 40, at 180, 185; see
also Schejter, Evolution of Cable TV Policy in Israel, supra note 40, at 180.
73 Schejter, Evolution of Cable TV Policy in Israel, supra note 40, at 180-8 1.
74 See Schejter, Cultural Obligationsin Broadcast,supra note 40, at 187.
75 See DAN CASPI & YECHIEL LIMOR, THE IN/OUTSIDERS: MASS MEDIA IN ISRAEL

147 (1999).
76 In June 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank of the Jordan River from Jordan
and other territories populated by Palestinian Arabs from Egypt, as well as Syrian
territory, in what came to be known in Israel as the "Six Day War." See MICHAEL B.
OREN, Six DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967 AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

(2002).

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 31

the Jews.7" In response, Israeli television's first broadcast in May
1968 featured "a proud display of Israel's powerful army
marching in its newly conquered capital - the cherished center of
Jewish religious identity."78 Since only a few Israelis owned
television sets at the time, the government's message was clearly
aimed at viewers from neighboring countries and newly-occupied
territories.
This propaganda-focused approach to television is also
apparent in the Broadcasting Authority Law enacted in 1965. 79
This law ordered the newly created public radio8" to provide
"broadcasts in the Arabic language for the [needs] of the Arabspeaking population" and for the advancement of "understanding
and peace with the neighboring countries according to the basic
course set by the state." 8 ' Thus, the local Arabic-speaking
population was, along with the population of neighboring states,
perceived as an enemy to which broadcasts should be targeted in
order to convey the state's message.
A short episode in Israeli broadcasting in the 1980s serves to
again demonstrate the motivation for establishing broadcasts. In
1986, under the auspices of the "launching administration" formed
shortly after the first reading of the Second Authority Law passed
in the Knesset, a new government-financed television channel
began broadcasting.8 2 Administrators cited the need to "seize the
frequencies" for fear it might be overtaken by neighboring
countries, although no such attempts were documented.83
2. The BBC and CNN Boycott
The Israeli government's innate distrust in the content of
foreign broadcasts-even those originating in countries known to
77 The acronym "UAR" in Hebrew translates to "thunder," thus the "Voice of
Thunder."
78 TASHA

G.

OREN, DEMON IN THE Box: JEWS, ARABS, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN

THE MAKING OF ISRAELI TELEVISION 132 (2004).

79 Broadcasting Authority Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI 103, art.3 (1964-1965) (Isr).
80 Television came under the same law in 1969. Id.
81 Id.

82 The Second Authority for Radio & Television Law, 1990, S.H. 59, art. 134.
83 CASPI & LIMOR, supra note 75, at 153; OREN TOKATLY, COMMUNICATION POLICY
IN ISRAEL 89 (2000).
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be allies-was most recently demonstrated during the Palestinian
uprising of 2000 and preparations for the American invasion of
Iraq in 2003. The government was concerned with how foreign
news channels transmitted abroad and re-transmitted locally on
cable and satellite were portraying the violent events of the
Palestinian uprising. In August 2002, the Cable and Satellite
Council allowed the three cable operators to drop CNN from their
menus, provided they replaced it with the Fox News channel, so as
not to reduce the number of foreign channels offered to
consumers. 84 The Cable and Satellite Council refused to publish
the minutes of the debate leading up to their decision, specifically
refusing to publish the public debate surrounding the "anti-Israeli"
slant that CNN was supposedly broadcasting.85 This left the public
to speculate whether it was, in fact, the content of CNN broadcasts
that prompted the decision.
In April 2003, this scenario repeated itself when the Cable and
Satellite Council allowed the operators to remove BBC World
from their offering. 86 A press release cited a commercial dispute

between the BBC and the cable operators, rather than the content
of the broadcasts, as the reason for BBC removal.87 Whether
commercial justifications were the reason behind the ad hoc
coalition of operators and regulators remains in question. What is
certain is that the government believed both CNN and BBC World
broadcasts were anti-Israeli, as demonstrated clearly in July 2003
when the government announced its decision to boycott the BBC,
citing the broadcasters' "anti-Israeli approach" to coverage of the
conflict88 and its portrayal of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as a
hero.8 9 Neither CNN nor the BBC remained indifferent to the
84 Council decision of Aug.

1, 2002, http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/

council1/decI 1.8.02.pdf.
85 Anat Balint, Cable and Satellite Council Refuses to Expose Minutes of Debate
on Discontinuanceof CNN Broadcasts, HAARETZ (ISRAEL), Sept. 19, 2002.

86 Council decision of Apr. 3, 2003, http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/
council 1/dec)l 3.4.03.pdf.
87 Anat Balint, Cable Council Authorises Removal of BBC World, HAARETZ
(ISRAEL), Apr. 7, 2003.
88 Sharon Sade, Ambassador in London and Jewish Leaders Criticize Boycott of
BBC, HAARETZ (ISRAEL), July 14, 2003.
89 Sharon Sade, Arafat Determines the BBC Is a Hero Made from the Materials of
Which Legends Are Made, HAARETZ (ISRAEL), July 1, 2003.
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official Israel outcry. During a June 2002 visit to Israel by a
senior CNN official, CNN "admitted mistakes," and the station
began broadcasting special programs that portrayed Israeli victims
of Palestinian violence.90 The BBC appointed a senior official to
examine its editorial policies regarding the Middle East conflict. 91
Both CNN92 and BBC World 93 eventually remained part of the
Israeli cable offering.
3. The Kirsch Case
After being subjected to Iraqi missile attacks during the
previous American-led invasion in 1991, and amid speculation in
2003 that Iraq had since obtained the capability to bomb Israel
with weapons of mass destruction, the Israeli military sought ways
to control the flow of information in case of future Iraqi attacks. 94
In January 1991, only a handful of Israelis subscribed to the
newly-launched cable television.95 The commercial channel was
still in its "establishment" stage and run by the government. 96 The
only "pluralism" offered to Israelis were the two competing public
radio services, IBA and military radio, whose broadcasts the
government had no
difficulty uniting in order to maintain full
97
content.
of
control
By 2003, however, cable and satellite penetration reached
seventy-eight percent of households and the cable offering
consisted of dozens of foreign channels, at least three of which98
90 Yair Ettinger, CNN Admits Mistakes and Attempts to Outdo Damage, HAARETZ

(ISRAEL), June 24, 2002.
91 Sharon Sade, Not Broadcasting Black and White Anymore, HAARETZ (ISRAEL),

May 31, 2004.
92 Anat Balint, Cable Companies Will Continue Broadcasting CNN,

HAARETZ

(ISRAEL), Oct. 24, 2002.
93 Anat Balint, Cable Companies Will Resume BBC World Broadcasts, HAARETZ
(ISRAEL), Apr. 15, 2003.
94 See generally HCJ 2753/03, 2791/03 Kirsch v. Chief of Staff of the Israeli Def.
Forces (2003), http://elyon 1.court.gov.il/files/03/530/027/109/03027530.109.pdf.

95 Sam Lehman Wilzig & Amit Schejter, "Israel," in MASS MEDIA IN THE MIDDLE
EAST: A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 109-25, 117 (Yahya Kamalipour & Hamid

Mowlana 1994).
96 OREN ToKATLY, COMMUNICATION POLICY IN ISRAEL 258 (2000).

97 Id. at 262.

98 Fox News, CNN, and BBC.
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were international news channels. 99 The military devised a plan
that in the event of an Iraqi missile attack, all broadcasting would
cease on both radio and television-including the foreign
networks-and in their place a five-minute video prepared by the
military press office would broadcast, followed by fifteen minutes
of instructions and explanations, as the army would deem fit. 00
The Supreme Court struck down these extreme measures in
Kirsch, but only by a vote of 2-1." °I The majority justices, Daliah
Dorner and Eliezer Rivlin, said that blocking foreign channels
during a time of emergency was "extreme, unreasonable, and
unjustifiable" under the Israeli constitutional framework. 0 2 The
government's paternalistic assumption that it knows better than its
citizens what information they need is at best far-fetched, said
Dorner, adding that when it acts under such assumptions, it should
do so with more humility.'0 3 Hence, government policies to date
aimed at controlling the free flow of news at times of national
emergency have been put on hold due to being described as
unjustifiable within existing values. 10 4
B. The Enemy Within: The Public BroadcastingRemit of
Internal Propaganda
As noted, since its inception, the goal of IBA has been
"broadcasts in the Arabic language for the needs of the Arabspeaking population and for the advancement of understanding
and peace with the neighboring countries according to the basic
course set by the state."'0 5 In fact, wording that banded citizens
and enemies together into one uniform audience was the only
phrase repeated verbatim in the law that established commercial
99 Based
on presentation by Director General of MOC, Dec. 2002,
http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/about/presentations/lect_9.12.02.ppt.
100 HCJ 2753/03, 2791/03 Kirsch v. Chief of Staff of the Israeli Def. Forces (2003),
http://elyon 1.court.gov.il/files/03/530/027109/03027530.109.pdf.

101 Id.
102 Id. at 8, 21.
103

Id.at 7.

104 Id.
105 See generally Schejter, Cultural Obligations in Broadcast, supra note 40
(analyzing the Broadcasting Authority Law and the uniform reference to Palestinian
citizens of the Israel and Arab citizens of neighboring states, as far as the goals of
broadcasting are concerned).
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television in 1990,106 as illustrated in earlier research.' °7 This
deeply engrained view of the Palestinian-Arab minority citizens as
enemies of the state was also maintained through the 1990s and
beyond by other government institutions. In 2003, a national
investigative committee headed by Supreme Court Justice
Theodore Orr called for the re-education of the national police
force to stop it from approaching Palestinian-Israelis as enemies."'
The events leading to Musawa Center indicate that, as far as
broadcasting is concerned, the Supreme Court itself condones this
policy. 09
'
The optimism that characterized Israeli geopolitics during the
second premiership of Yitzhak Rabin from 1992 until his
assassination on November 4, 1995 was also the backdrop for the
launching of "Channel 3," an IBA-operated satellite channel
targeting the whole Middle East. 10
The channel started
broadcasting in 1993 and in 1995 developed into a daily service
with programs in Hebrew and Arabic."' At the same time, TBA
started lowering the number of hours of television broadcasts on
its terrestrial channel that targeted the Israeli-Palestinian
population. 112
The eventual breakdown of negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority in October 2000 led to a renewed outbreak
of violence in Israel and in the occupied territories reminiscent of
that seen in 1967.'
In June 2002, IBA launched yet another
satellite channel targeting both Israeli-Palestinians and citizens
in neighboring Arab countries." 4
Soon thereafter, IBA's
106 The Second Authority for Radio & Television Law, 1990, S.H. 59, art. 5
107 See Schejter, CulturalObligationsin Broadcast,supra note 40, at 196.

108 Report of the 2003 Investigative Committee headed by Justice Theodore Orr,
http://or.barak.net.il/inside_index.htm [hereinafter Orr Report].
109 HCJ 375/03 Musawa Ctr. for the Rights of Arab Citizens of Isr. v. Prime
Minister (2004), http://elyon I .court.gov.iI/files/03/750/003108/03003750.108.pdf.
110 Shachar Abiri, The New Middle East, 39 THE SEVENTH EYE JOURNAL (ISRAEL)

36-37 (2002).
1I1 Irit Rosenblum, Channel 3 Starts Working in Full Format; Will Broadcast
Programsin Hebrew and Arabic, HAARETZ (ISRAEL), Jan. 22, 1995.
112 Ehud Asheri, Stop the Viewers' Decline, HAARETZ (ISRAEL), Apr. 24, 1996.
113 DENNIS Ross, THE MISSING PEACE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR MIDDLE

EAST PEACE 730 (2005).

114 See IBA Freedom of Information Report, http://dover.iba.org.i/dover/htm
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management announced its plans to eliminate programming in
Arabic altogether from its terrestrial channel and to divert all
programs to the new channel.115 In June 2003, a decision was
made to unite both satellite channels and converge all existing
Arabic language broadcasting that would target both local and
foreign audiences. 1 16 This decision to deny Israeli-Palestinian
audiences the terrestrial offering of public television was soon
challenged in court." 7
In mid-July 2003, the Supreme Court issued an order nisi to
the government and IBA demanding that they explain their
reasons for eliminating broadcasting in Arabic from public
broadcasting's main terrestrial channel." 8 In January 2004, the
Supreme Court announced that it had been informed by the state
that as of that month, the satellite channel's broadcasts would be
re-broadcast terrestrially for one hour a day and a few more hours
on weekends." 9 As a result, the petition was rescinded and the
petitioners were deemed victors. 20 However, the actual outcome
of this decision was that IBA began re-transmitting a propaganda
channel aimed at enemy countries into Israel in order to abide by
the legal requirement to provide a public service to IsraeliPalestinians. Neither the Israeli-Palestinian petitioners nor the
courts commented on this paradoxical outcome, which had
citizens of the state all but officially categorized as enemies.
C. Culture or Advertising? The Banning of Transborder
Advertising
Israeli cultural-defensive policies are not limited to the ArabIsraeli conflict. The dominant cultural paradigm lies at the heart
/DoverFreedomOflnfo.html.
115 Anat Balint, Demand to Resume Broadcastingin Arabic on Channel 1, HAARETZ
(ISRAEL), Oct. 17, 2002.

116 Anat Balint, The Middle East Channel Will Be United with Channel 33,
HAARETZ (ISRAEL), June 11, 2003.

117 HCJ 375/03 Musawa Ctr. for the Rights of Arab Citizens of Isr. v. Prime
Minister (2004), http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files/03/750/003108/03003750.108.pdf.
118 Interim Decision [2003], HCJ 375/03 Musawa Ctr. for the Rights of Arab
Citizens of Isr. v. Prime Minister [2004] (unpublished interim decision on file with
author), http://elyon 1.court.gov.il/files/03/750/003104/03003750.104.pdf.
119 Id.
120 Id.
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of the extreme efforts to block transfrontier
broadcasting, which
21
culminated in the Media Most decision.'
Israeli law divides channels transmitted on cable and satellite
platforms into several categories. 12 The difference inthe rules
regarding these different channel groups is particularly relevant to
broadcast financing, because the right to advertise is restricted.
While advertising is permitted on the commercial channels
operating under the Second Authority Law, 123 cable television
franchisees cannot include advertisements in their "own
broadcasts,"'' 24 but the Minister of Communications can grant them
permission to do so in a prescribed procedure. 2 5 It is the
definition of "own broadcasts" that lies at the heart of this most
recent legal battle.
1.

The Story of the "Odellia' 2 6

It was not until 1990 that commercial television became an
option under Israeli law, with broadcasts commencing in late
1993. 127 However, Israeli lawmakers and regulators were forced
to confront the issue of transborder advertising as far back as the
early 1980s, as private entrepreneurs planned to broadcast
commercial television to Israeli audiences from the Mediterranean
Sea'28 in order to circumvent the monopoly Israel Television
enjoyed and the commensurate ban imposed on television
advertising. 129 Owners of a ship named "Odellia" planned to

121 HCJ 6962/03, 10338/03 Media Most Inc. v. Cable & Satellite Council (2004),
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files/03/620/069/vl5/03069620.v 5.pdf.
122 The Communications (Telecommunications & Broadcasting) Law, 1982, S.H.
1060, 218 (as amended) at ch. B1.
123 The Second Authority for Radio & Television Law, 1990, S.H. 59, art. 81

124 The Telecommunications (amend. 4) Law, 1986, S.H. 224, art. 6(24)(a).
125

Id. art. 6(24)(b).

126 YEHIEL LIMOR, PIRATE RADIO INISRAEL: STATUS REPORT 20 (Hebrew University

of Jerusalem, Smart Family Communication Institute 1998), http://www.amalnet
.kl 2.il/sites/commun/library/radio/comiO477.htm.
127 See The Second Authority for Radio & Television Law, 1990, S.H. 59.
128 D.K. (1981) 2745; YEHIEL LIMOR, PIRATE RADIO IN ISRAEL: STATUS REPORT 20,
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Smart Family Communication Institute 1998);
http://www.amalnet.kl 2.il/sites/communlibrary/radio/comiO477.htm.
129 D.K. (1981) 2745.
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launch a commercial television channel from the sea. 13° The
government responded by initiating an amendment to the Wireless
Telegraphy Ordinance that prohibited broadcasting from the
seas. 13' The Minister of Communications explained that the law
was initiated because of a "particular ship" planning to commence
commercial broadcasts aimed at Israel.3 2
The law forbade
assisting such broadcasts by selling advertising time in Israel on
their behalf. 133 To determine whether such broadcasts were in fact
"aimed at Israel," the law required "usage of the Hebrew
language"-a step up from the proposed bill requiring that the
whole broadcast be carried in Hebrew 3 4 -"advertisements for
products or services marketed in Israel."' 135 The practice of
outlawing broadcasts from ships was not conceived in Israel, it
already existed in the European Agreement for the Prevention of
Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations outside National Territories,

enacted in Strasbourg in 1965.136
There is no evidence in the Knesset records that any direct or
indirect effect on the media outlets existing at the time was even
discussed, leaving the Knesset actions open to interpretation. The
Odellia case represented the first attempt by television
broadcasters not originating in a neighboring Arab country to
target Israeli television audiences, other than for propaganda
purposes. Israeli regulators' and legislators' prompt action to end
the foreign broadcasts and maintain IBA's monopoly on
broadcasting was both impressive and successful. Why, however,

130

Id.

131 The Wireless Telegraphy Ordinance, 1981, S.H. 2, art. 2 (which added art. 5A5C to the Ordinance).
132 D.K. (1981) 2745.
133 The Wireless Telegraphy Ordinance, 1981, S.H. 2, art. 2 (which added art. 5A5C to the Ordinance).
134 The Wireless Telegraphy (amend.) Ordinance, Proposed Bill, 1981, H.H. 1541,
389.
135 At the time the Odellia was planning to launch its television broadcasts, a radio
service broadcasting from a ship sailing the Mediterranean and operated by peace activist
Abe Nathan was actively selling advertising time in Israel. The Odellia law thus
specifically targeted television broadcasts, as the government saw apparently no threat in
the "peace" message of the lone seaman. D.K. (1981) 2745.
136 See Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, no. 53, http://www.conventions
.coe.int/Treaty/enfrreaties/Word/053.
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were they in such a hurry to stop the broadcasts?
2. The Development of Policy RegardingRetransmissionof ForeignBroadcasts
Cable television planning in Israel started back in the mid1970s, but the issue of transfrontier broadcasts via cable was only
addressed implicitly at first. A 1979 report commissioned to
design the first commercial terrestrial channel proposed setting up
a very limited cable service.137 While offering a favorable view of
the introduction of 'cable television into Israel, the report said it
should carry only existing broadcast channels instead of becoming
a basis for creating new channels, which would necessarily include
foreign broadcasts.138 A 1982 report on cable television, however,
became the basis for the cable television policy eventually
implemented.' 39 This report recommended creating regional cable
franchises immediately, taking into account the cultural and social
impact of a television barrage on a country not yet familiar with
the concept of choice in television fare and, particularly, with the
effects of foreign television.'40 The report described the possible
negative effects of television, weighing them against its
acculturating potential and society's need for entertainment.14 1 In
particular, the report expressed concern about the potential effect
of foreign channels being re-transmitted on the cable system,
noting that the "multiplicity of foreign programming will have the
effect of a foreign culture that will enter the individual's home and
reside with him as part of his culture."'' 42
It therefore
recommended the allowance of only a very limited number of
channels. 141
Although the Telecommunications Law adopted these
recommendations, in general, it disregarded the recommendations
137 See Haim Kubersky, A Report of the Committee Clarifying the Issue of a Second
Television Channel in Israel (1979) (unpublished report on file with author).
138 Id. at 29.
139 See Yoram Barsela, Report of the Committee on Cable Television (1982)
(unpublished report on file with author).
140 Id.at 38, 43.
141 id. at 37.

Id. at 6.
143 Id. at 20-2 1.
142
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limiting the number of television channels, and most notably, the
recommendation regarding foreign satellite channels.' 44 The law
also noted that the franchise holders may re-broadcast foreign
channels, including satellite channels, with no restrictions. 4 5 No
documentation has been found to explain this change in
position. 146
Seven years later, when petitioned to use her
ministerial powers and allow advertising on cable operators "own
channels," then-presiding Communications Minister Shulamit
Aloni argued in an affidavit submitted to the Supreme Court that
she adopted the recommendations of a committee she formed to
study the issue, according to which advertising on foreign
channels re-transmitted into Israel is the status quo, is allowed,
and should be maintained. 47 A previous committee appointed by
one of Aloni's predecessors, Raphael Pinhasi, reached a similar
conclusion. 48 When asked to address the issue of advertising on
foreign channels, the deputy attorney general ruled on July 13,
1995, that the law 49does not prohibit advertising on re-transmitted
satellite channels. 1
One of the first acts of the right-wing coalition that took power
in 1996 following the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin was to appoint a committee to study the restructuring of the
Israeli radio and television market.15 ° The commission proposed a
new policy based on the principle of "open skies," which rendered

144 The Telecommunications (amend. 4) Law, 1986, S.H. 224.
145 Id.art. 6(21)(3).
146 CASPI & LIMOR supra note 75, at 156; OREN TOKATLY, COMMUNICATION POLICY
INISRAEL 89 (2000). The authors contend that: "legislators did not interpret correctly the
Amendment's political, social and economic significance."
147 HCJ 1413/93 Cable Television Corps. Ass'n in Isr. v. Minister of Comm,
retracted. The committee report is on file with the author along with an affidavit by the
then Chairperson of the Cable Council affirming that the Minister had adopted the
policy.
148 See Yitzhak Ish-Horowitz, Report of the Public Committee on the Issue of
Advertising on Cable Channels (1992) (unpublished report on file with author).
149 Letter of the deputy attorney general dated July 13, 1995 (on file with the
author).
150 See Eli Nisan, Report of the Committee on Extending and Reforming of
Broadcasting Choice (1997) (unpublished report on file with author), English summary
of the report at http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/peled/peled.pdfwww.moc.gov
.il/new/documents/peled/peled.pdf.
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transfrontier broadcasting virtually inevitable.15 ' The Israeli
government adopted the report and started practicing a policy of
openness, or at least indifference, to the televised re-transmission
of transfrontier channels.' 52 Paradoxically, the 1998 legislation of
the committee's recommendations, the climax of the "open skies"
ideology, ushered in a re-closing of the skies and construction of
new barriers to the free flow of transborder information.' 53 The
legislation included restrictions on Israelis and on those operating
from within Israel, aimed at preventing the deployment of
unlicensed direct-to-home satellite services.' 54 The law forbade
Israelis or persons residing in Israel from launching a satellite
service aimed at Israel, both from within Israel and from outside
its borders without a license.'55 The law deviated from the
definitions for such broadcasts set in Odellia and defined
broadcasts as "aimed at Israel" if they met at least one of the
following three criteria: (1) they regularly broadcast a majority of
their programming in Hebrew; (2) they regularly broadcast
programs in Hebrew on prime time; or (3) they regularly broadcast
advertising
for products that are predominantly aimed at the Israeli
56
1
market.
3. The METV Cases
The series of cases involving Middle East Television in
1998 and 1999151 were the first cases regarding transfrontier
151

Id.

See Decision no. 2444 of the Israeli government, adopted on Aug. 8, 1997,
http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/peled/government.pdfwww.moc.gov.il/new/docu
ments/peled/government.pdf.
153 See The Law to Boost Economic Growth, Employment and Achieve the Goals of
the 1998 National Budget (legislative amendments), 1998, S.H. 73.
154 Id.
155 Id.art. 27.
156 The law refrained from defining "prime time" or "products predominantly aimed
at the Israeli market."
157 They included HCJ 7051/98 Tel'Ad Jerusalem Studios, Ltd. v. Minister of
Comm. [1999], retracted, http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files/98/510/070/e08/98070510
.e08.pdf; HCJ 474/99, [1999] M.E. Television Servs. Ltd. v. Minister of Comm.,
retracted, (unpublished decision on file with author); HCJ 388/99 Netanel Gal-Er v.
Minister of Comm., petition denied on May 10, 1999, (unpublished decision on file with
author), http://elyon 1.court.gov.il/files/99/880/003/109/99003880.109.pdf
[hereinafter
collectively "METV Cases"].
152
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broadcasting following the enactment of the new law. These cases
were not directly related to the new law because they involved the
re-transmission of a Christian-American owned station that had
been broadcasting from Southern Lebanon since 1982158 and from
Cyprus as of 2000,159 while the law itself referred to signals that

were owned by Israelis or being broadcast from Israel. The
METV signal was transmitted from terrestrial stations and was one
of the first five foreign stations whose re-transmission was
permitted as a "foreign broadcast" under the regulations
introduced back in 1987.160 In 1996, the METV signal began to
broadcast on the Israeli communications satellite "Amos," thus
creating-perhaps a bit ahead of its time-a transnational
"superstation" received all over the Middle East.161
Cross-frontier financing of channels through advertisement
sales is a developed practice in Europe, 162 but certainly not in the
tumultuous Middle East. As recently as January 2005, even the
transnational AI-Jazeera Arab network that originates in Doha and
is received by thirty to fifty million
viewers, needed government
63
subsidies to finance operations. 1
Back in the early 1990s, METV's broadcasts drew regulatory
attention because of their Christian message, and calls to remove
them from cable television's offering were approved by the court
when it was established that they were transmitted to the cable1
operators via a microwave link-hence, not "over the air."'
158 DOUGLAS BOYD, BROADCASTING IN THE ARAB WORLD: A SURVEY OF THE

ELECTRONIC MEDIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 79 (1993). See also A.R. Badran & Christian
Badran, Broadcasting in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Case of Middle East
Television, 47 GAZETTE: INT'L J.FOR COMM. STUD., 33, 33-46 (1991); Douglas Boyd,
Lebanese Broadcasting: Unofficial ElectronicMedia During a Prolonged Civil War, 35
J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 269, 269-87 (1991).

159 Some of the station's history can be accessed on its website. See Middle East
Television, http://www.metv.org.
160 Telecommunications Regulations (Broadcasts by a Franchise Holder), 1987, KT
5640, 138.
161 See METV Cases; see also supra note 157 and accompanying text.
162 George Weddel & Andre Lange, Regulatory and Financial Issues in
Transfrontier Television in Europe, in BROADCASTING FINANCE IN TRANSITION 382, 387
(Jay G. Blumler & T.J. Nossiter 1991).
163 Steven R. Weisman, Under Pressure, Qatar May Sell Jazeera Station, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, at Al.
164 HCJ 5950/94 Yisrael Ben David v. Minister of Comm. [1995] (unpublished
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However, when transmission was launched on the "Amos,"
broadcasts once again became part of the cable offering. 165 In the
summer of 1998, the "Channel 2" franchises campaigned to
remove METV from the cable channel offering, arguing that the
foreign-owned station threatened their commercial interests by
targeting Israeli audiences with advertising. They filed a petition
with the Supreme Court urging the Cable Council to remove the
channel. 66 The petition prompted the Cable Council to make a
series of decisions creating a new category of channels called
"Satellite Channels Aimed At Israel"-popularly dubbed at the
time as "converted" 167 channels. 168 The Council adopted the
criteria created by the 1998 law of prohibited satellite channels,
but extended them to channels not necessarily owned by Israelis or
broadcasting from Israel. 169 METV filed a petition with the High
Court of Justice, 7 ° which eventually led to a compromise
agreement allowing its continued re-transmission. 71 At the same
time, the Cable Council undertook to set up a regulatory regime
targeting all "converted" channels and published a first draft of
these regulations that allows the creation of channels in the new
category, subject to two major restrictions: (1) they are not to carry
advertising for products marketed predominantly in Israel,
advertising in Hebrew or home-shopping in Hebrew; and (2) they
are to invest a minimum of $1.5 million in local Israeli
programming, which should constitute at least ten percent of their

decision on file with author).
165 See METV Cases, supra note 157.
166 HCJ 7051/98 Tel'ad Jerusalem Studios v. Minister of Comm. [1999], retracted,

(portions of unpublished decision are on file with author).
167 Using the Hebrew term for "conversion," associated with converts to Judaism.
168 See, e.g., Protocol of Knesset of March 20, 2001, http://www.knesset.gov.ilV
protocols/data/rtf/kalkala/2001-03-20.rtf.
169 The Council decision may be accessed at http://www.moc.gov.il/new/
documents/peled/foreign I .pdf.
170 HCJ 474/99 M.E. Television Services v. Cable Council [1999], retracted,
(unpublished decision on file with author). The author served as counsel to METV in
this petition.
171 Details of the compromise were outlined by the justices in the Gal-Er Case.
HCJ 388/99 Netanel Gal-Er v. Minister of Comm., petition denied on May 10, 1999,
(unpublished decision), http://elyon I.court.gov.il/files/99/880/003/109/99003880.109.pdf.
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program fare. 172
This new policy groups the foreign channels together with the
local channels as participants in the government's controlled
programming offer. The foreign channels were to create local
programming in order to dilute the "non-Israeli" fare in their
broadcasts. 173 This created an inherent contradiction: on the one
hand, the channel was prohibited from advertising in Hebrew,
while on the other, it was required to broadcast original programs
in Hebrew that were to be produced in Israel.' 74 This draft never
took effect, however, and only in 2002 were the regulations
discussed in Media Most enacted.'75
4. The Aftermath of METV and Amendment 15
As previous studies demonstrate, cable television policy in
Israel embodies national values like "unity" and "nationalism" 1at
76
times, and values of national conflict and "tribalism" at others.
Amendment No. 15 to the Telecommunications Law adopted in
1997 created a new category of channels-"special interest"
channels-that were to be carried on one-sixth of the cable
network's capacity, originally designated for use at the
government's discretion. 177 As part of this amendment the Knesset
authorized the government to create these special interest
channels, defined as channels aimed at a certain linguistic,
cultural, or traditional audience or channels centered on a
particular topic. 178 In order to ensure that language-based channels
do not threaten the established "general interest" channels, the law
specified that these channels must carry most of their programs
and all advertising in that language. 179 This policy stemmed from
pressures from the commercial channel's franchise holders to
172 Cable Council Regulations (1999),
peled/foreign I.pdf.

http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/

173 Id.
174 Id.

175 Communication Regulations (Telecommunications & Broadcasting) (Broadcast
License Holder) (amend.), 2002, KT 6146, 765.
176 Schejter, Evolution of Cable TV Policy in Israel,supra note 40, at 177-200.

177 The Telecommunications (amend. 15) Law, 1997, S.H. 102.
178 Id. art. 1.
179 Id. art. 3, incorporated into the law as article 6(34)(1)(5)(1).
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maintain at least their dominance, if not their monopoly, on the
The government identified the
Hebrew advertising market.
following as special interests: providing channels for Arabic,
Russian, and Amharic 80 speakers and creating a channel focused
on the Jewish tradition; a channel focused on Israeli music; and a
channel focused on the provision of news and information.181
The outcome of the policy was the eventual creation, through
government licenses, of two "thematic channels:" an Israeli music
channel and a Russian language channel. 182 The latter channel was
to compete with the Russian language transfrontier package
offered by Israeli cable and satellite operators and minimize the
uncontrolled impact of those channels. 183 Presumably aware of the
fact that ethnic media use leads to stronger ethnic identification
over time, the government must have also realized that
uncontrolled ethnic media can help sustain existing ethnic
identification84 and work against the government's vision of cultural
uniformity.
Like its broadcast predecessors, the Russian-language channel
broadcasting from within Israel was charged with very specific
cultural obligations.' 85 An appendix to its license 8 6 lists its
"cultural obligations,'' 187 which include providing an "adequate
representation to the means of life in Israel, to the Israeli character

180 An Ethiopian dialect.
181See Nisan, supra note 150, at 8.
182 See Music channel "Music 24" License, http://www.moc.gov.i/new/documents
/mismachim/rishayon-music_10.12.02.pdf; Russian Language Channel "Israel Plus"
No
License, http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/mismachimrishayon-5.12.01.pdf.
attempt to license an Amharic language channel has been made. A license was awarded
to a news channel, but it was eventually rescinded after the channel failed to launch. A
license was awarded to an Arabic language channel that has yet failed to launch, and a
tender is underway for launching the "traditional" channel.
183 See Dan Caspi, Hanna Adoni, Akiba A. Cohen & Nelly Elias, The Red, the
White and the Blue: The Russian Media in Israel, 64 GAZETTE: INT'L J. FOR COMM.
STUD., 537, 542 (2002).
184 Leo Jeffres, Ethnicity and Ethnic Media Use: A Panel Study, 27 COMM. RES.

496, 496 (2000).
185 See appendix to Russian Language Channel "Israel Plus"
http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/mismachim/rishayon-c.pdf § 1.1.
186 See id.
187 Id. § 1.1.
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'
of life."188
Notably, it calls for 150 weekly minutes of
programming dedicated to issues on the general public agenda in
Israel and 135 minutes of programming dedicated to issues on the
agenda of the Russian-speaking population in Israel, supplemented
with 260 minutes of "enrichment programs that may help in the
absorption of Russian-speaking immigrants in the Israeli
experience."' 189 The channel is allowed to buy its news programs
only from a body licensed to broadcast news in Israel-in other
words, one that has a government license or is under government
supervision.1 9°
According to two new sets of regulations created in 2002,'9' a
cable or satellite operator cannot re-transmit a satellite channel
without the Cable and Satellite Council's approval. In addition,
two central concepts, the "own broadcasts" and the "broadcasts
intended mostly for the Israeli public or a part thereof' were
redefined. 92 The "own broadcasts" defined in the original
regulations from 1987 as "broadcasts whose source is the studio of
the franchise holder, whether self-produced or purchased,"' 93 are
now defined as "including broadcasts that are not broadcast in the
franchise holder's own channels, that are intended mostly for the
Israeli public or a part thereof."' 194 In other words, the Council
defined "own broadcasts" to include broadcasts that are not "own
broadcasts" by its own admission, stating that they are "own
broadcasts" in the legal sense, if not literally.'95
188

Id.§ 1.3.

189

Id.§ 5.

190 Id.§ 7.1.
191 Communication Regulations (Telecommunications & Broadcasting) (Broadcast
License Holder) (amend.), 2002, KT 6146, 340; Communications Regulations
(Telecommunications & Broadcasting) (Broadcast License Holder) (amend. 2), 2002,
KT 6169, 764.
192 KT 6146, 340; Communications Regulations (Telecommunications and
Broadcasting) (Broadcast License Holder) (amend. 2), 2002, KT 6169, 764, art. 2.
193 HCJ 6962/03, 10338/03 Media Most Inc. v. Cable & Satellite Council [2004]
(unpublished decision on file with author), http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files/03/620
/069/v15/03069620.v 15.pdf.
194 Nisan, supra note 150, art. 1.
195 Id. art. 1. Such a paradoxical definition exists elsewhere in Israeli law. The
most renowned example is the Fishing Ordinance; Article I defines a "fish" as "all
marine creatures whether they are fish or whether they are not fish." Fishing Ordinance
1937, Palestine Gazette, 137.
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New presumptions were needed to identify "broadcasts aimed
at the Israeli public," including one that stated that if at least half
of the broadcasts are not in Hebrew, the Council can still rule that
they are aimed at Israeli audiences or a part thereof. On the other
hand, the Council said that a channel viewed by a minimum of
eight million households outside Israel and complying only with
the criterion that it broadcast advertising
in Hebrew can be
' 196
considered "not being aimed at Israel."
These new rules have established a new standard of absurdity
in the Israeli government's ongoing efforts to "close the skies" in
order to combat the barrage of digital choice. In order to avoid
competition with commercial "Channel 2," the governmentlicensed "Russian" channel was not allowed to broadcast
advertising in Hebrew. 197 However, it was awarded a de facto
monopoly on Russian advertising in Israel. The creation of
advertising monopolies of this sort contradicts all theories of
market based economic development. In addition, they create
cultural ghettos, which are no less problematic. Another aspect of
this arrangement is the differentiation between the channels based
on their presumed cultural impact: while the regulations restrict
access of the Russian language channel in order to avoid dilution
of the "absorption package" aimed at new immigrants, they are
designed to allow the continued influx of American culture aimed
at Hebrew-speaking Israeli youth.
5. The Media Most Case
The aforementioned regulations and their constitutionality
were challenged in the Supreme Court by Media Most Ltd., the
Israeli representative of an American-based Russian language
channel called RTVi that was retransmitted by the Israeli cable
and satellite operators and financed exclusively through
advertising. 198 The decision in this case, written by Justice Esther
196 Communications Regulations (Telecommunications & Broadcasting) (Broadcast

License Holder) (amend. 2), 2002, KT 6169, 764, art. 2. The second rule was set in
order to allow the re-transmission of MTV that was broadcasting only advertising in
Hebrew.
197 Telecommunications (amend. 15) Law, 1997, S.H. 102, art. 3, incorporated into
the law as article 6(34)(1)(5)(1).
198 HCJ 6962/03, 10338/03 Media Most Inc. v. Cable & Satellite Council (2004),
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files/03/620/069/v15/03069620.vl 5.pdf.
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Hayut, clearly supported the government's goal of minimizing the
impact of transborder channels. 99 Justice Hayut asserted that "the
broadcasting channels of the electronic media are a limited
resource, and thus the legislature is required to regulate their usage
and not leave them wide open for the forces of the market."2 °0 She
then acknowledged that the initial ban on advertising, as defined,
did not apply to re-transmitted transfrontier channels but only to
"own broadcasts" under the old definitions.2 1 However, she
concluded that changing times might necessitate new
definitions.2 2 Although the ban on advertising on cable channels
was originally enacted to protect the viability of newspapers, its
purpose today is to protect commercial television channels.20 3
Hayut argued that the term "own" should be interpreted to mean
all channels transmitted by a cable or satellite operator. 20 This
change in the definition is justified, she asserted, since a
technological change allows the creation of versions of channels
targeting the Israeli population and threatening local channels in a
The court concluded that
manner not possible before. 20 5
preserving the viability of commercial channels is a reasonable
government policy; therefore, the change in interpretation is
reasonable as well.2 6 On this basis the court denied the petition
and allowed the banning of the channel. 0 7
III.Discussion
The required first question in Fischer's methodology, a
detailed description of Israeli transfrontier broadcasting policies,
has been provided in the previous chapter. As for the second
question of whether the policy succeeded, the answer is a
straightforward affirmative. Until the introduction of commercial
199 See
200

id.

Id.at 9.

201 Id.at 9.
202 Id.at 11.
203 Id.

204 HCJ 6962/03, 10338/03 Media Most Inc. v. Cable & Satellite Council (2004),
http://elyon l.court.gov.il/files/03/620/069/v l5/03069620.v 15.pdf.
205 Id.at 12.
206 Id.at 13.
207 Id.at 24.
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television, IBA (the public broadcaster) was the main source of
news for Israelis.2 °8 All attempts to circumvent regulations
designed to maintain the dominance of the government's preferred
cultural paradigm have been successfully blocked: the "Odellia"
never set sail, METV now broadcasts in English, RTVi stopped
broadcasting to Israelis, and Israel's own transfrontier broadcasts
targeting enemy states now serve an internal constituency,
traditionally regarded as a "fifth column."20 9 The second Iraq war
came and went for Israelis; not a missile was fired at Israel and the
government's plan to block transfrontier broadcasting was never
put to the test. 210 All of these events show that the government's
policy has achieved its explicit goals.
This section of the study attempts to reveal the underlying
assumptions of Israeli policymakers whose position regarding the
regulation of transfrontier broadcasting has turned full circle. It
will question whether this about face can be justified within the set
of values to which the Israeli system purportedly ascribes.
Exposing the underlying assumptions provides a glimpse into the
implicit goals.
The outcome of the policies addressed in Kirsch, Al Musaawa,
and Media Most is twofold. Some Israelis today have limited
access to sources and interpretation of information, with
"information" in this context referring to both "news" and
"culture. 21 ' Indeed, throughout the years Israeli governments
have supported policies that control the information environment
of select social groups-reducing the diversity of perspectives
communicated throughout society and specifically to those
groups-and succeeded in doing so.
These policies favor
privileged rights over personal autonomy and wider choice of

208 Elihu Katz, And Deliver Us from Segmentation, 546 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 22,28 (1996).
209 Eli Avraham, Press, Politics, and the Coverage of Minorities in Divided
Societies: The Case ofArab Citizens in Israel, 8 HARV. INT'L J. PREsS/POL. 7, 22 (2003).
210 As mentioned by Justice Dorner in the Kirsch verdict. HCJ 2753/03, 2791/03
Kirsch v. Chief of Staff of the Israeli Def. Forces
.court.gov.il/files/03/530/027/109/03027530.109.pdf.

(2003) at 2, http://elyonl

211 This conclusion is based on the description in the text; Russian immigrants can
only access news from an Israeli licensed channel and Israeli Arabs get their terrestrial
public service from a propaganda arm of the government.
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In adopting Benkler' s 212 approach to
information sources.
evaluating communication and information regulations along these
criteria, the policies this study highlights cannot be considered
justifiable. Other scholars believe that "promoting unconditional
freedom of public debate in newly democratizing societies is in
many circumstances likely to make the problem [of nationalist and
ethnic conflict] worse.,, 213 This latter approach may challenge the
analysis offered by this study. Therefore, it is important to
differentiate between policies adopted in the formative years of the
state and policies adopted in recent years. At the same time, even
recognizing the legitimacy of policies that limit the free flow of
information for the sake of national unity in times of crisis such as
the birth of a state-a position not espoused herein-merely
underscores how much a society needs to reject such policies.
Indeed, the "special circumstances" under which these policies
were constructed-the massive immigration creating the need for
the Russian language channel discussed in Media Most or the
looming missile attack behind the Kirsch decision-further
highlight why these policies are dangerous even in the context of a
newly democratizing society as they tend to resurface again and
again when the given society has presumably matured.
Many signs of a system that is paternalistic and holds that the
media can and should be used by governments to influence and
mold national culture exist in Israel. These signs include: the
description of the Israeli population that watched transfrontier
broadcasts in the 1960s as the "most vulnerable," the portrayal of
the defense of the national culture in the 1980s as a "need," the
delegation of detailed cultural tasks to public and private
broadcasters in the 1960s and 1990s, the creation of governmentlicensed "cultural ghettos" of broadcasting even when commercial
alternatives were available, the move back to using propaganda
tools in order to communicate with minority groups, and the
support of efforts to limit foreign broadcasts based information
during times of conflict. This paternalistic system has been the
impetus behind Israeli media policymaking from its inception to

212 See generally Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy,

Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23 (2001).
213 Jack Snyder & Karen Ballentine, Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,
INT'L SEC. 5, 6 (Fall 1996).
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this very day.
In the 1960s, transfrontier broadcasting was deemed a threat to
national security and prompted the creation of Israeli television
with its own propaganda mission in which the government sought
to offer its own interpretation of events.2"4 In the 1980s,
transfrontier broadcasts were perceived as a threat to the
monopoly of Israeli television-that was assigned an ambitious
cultural mission and whose news program was viewed at times by
more than two-thirds of the population 21-and were blocked by

restrictive legislation. In this case, the government sought to
eliminate competing sources of information. In the 1990s, a
different environment altogether allowed for the re-transmission of
transfrontier broadcasts on newly deployed cable systems, and
afterward on direct-to-home satellite as well. This re-transmission
was relatively unobstructed until the paternalistic approach to
broadcasting policy resurfaced, with the government attempting to
create niche channels on its cable infrastructure capacity in order
to serve ethnic and cultural groups as it saw fit, and specifically in
order to absorb them culturally into society according to the
government-dictated cultural order. In this case, it started out by
offering a government-regulated interpretation of events and went
on to block the access of viewers to competing sources of
information and interpretation.216
The justifications for the policy using the European
"yardstick" for measurement help highlight the underlying
motivations of the Israeli government. The contradiction between
the Euro-centrist "cultural-defensive" mode, on the one hand, and
the pan-European "cultural-neutral" mode, on the other, make
the comparison with Israel difficult. Indeed, Israeli law and
regulations have adopted a quota system somewhat resembling the
European model in order to confront the issue of foreign content
on local channels and promote local production.2 17

Public,21 8

214 TASHA G. OREN, DEMON IN THE Box: JEWS, ARABS, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN

THE MAKING OF ISRAELI TELEVISION 132 (Rutgers University Press 2004).
215

Katz, supra note 208, at 29.

216 Id.
217 See Encouragement of Original Israeli Productions in Television Broadcasts
Law, 1996, S.H. 308, amended by The Telecommunications Law, 2001, S.H. 530; The
Second Authority for Radio & Television Law, 1990, S.H. 59, amended by
Arrangements in the State of Israel National Economy Law, 2000, S.H. 140 and The
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commercial,'2

9

cable, 220 and satellite 22 1 television all have their

own quotas. Still, there is no relevant region with which Israel is
being harmonized culturally that parallels Europe.
To the
contrary, cross-border broadcasting is seen as serving Israel's
enemies and is separate from the debate regarding cultural and
commercial dominance issues. However, the cases of Odellia,
METV I and II, as well as Media Most, did not involve enemies of
the State of Israel, as they were commercial endeavors trying to
take advantage of the Israeli media market's economic potentiala motivation similar to the European model-and they
represented, in the eyes of the authorities, attempts to circumvent
Israeli regulation just like their European counterparts have done:
Odellia wanted to exploit an existing ban on television advertising,
while METV-in both cases-and Media Most wanted to take
advantage of the liberal approach to re-transmitted signals on the
cable and satellite platforms that supposedly existed at the time.22
As far as the authorities were concerned, these were not
"accidental" overspills resulting from unplanned large satellite
footprints, but concerted efforts to broadcast to Israeli audiences
while bypassing Israeli regulations.223
Guaranteeing the
commercial viability of free-to-air broadcast media was the

Second Authority for Radio & Television Law, 2003, S.H. 528; Encouragement of
Original Israeli Productions in Television Broadcasts Law, 1996, S.H. 308, amended
by Telecommunications Law, 2001, S.H. 530; Administrative Ruling, 2004,
http://www.moc.gov.il/new/documents/council2/yes-licl.pdf (This is a reference to the
"YES" license; it is only accessible on the web and was not made part of the K.T.).
218 Encouragement of Original Israeli Productions in Television Broadcasts Law,
1996, S.H. 308, art. 1, 3, amended by Telecommunications Law, 2001, S.H. 530.
219 Second Authority for Radio & Television Law, 1990, S.H. 59, art. 59 amended
by Arrangements in the State of Israel National Economy Law, 2000, S.H. 140, art. I and
Second Authority for Radio & Television Law, 2003, S.H. 528, art. 9.
220 Encouragement of Original Israeli Productions in Television Broadcasts Law,
1996, S.H. 308, art. 3, amended by Telecommunications Law, 2001, S.H. 530.
221 See generally Administrative Ruling, 2004, §14.3, http://www.moc.gov.il/new/
documents/council2/yeslic l.pdf. (This is a reference to the "YES" license; it is only
accessible on the web and was not made part of the K.T.) (referring to the license
awarded to the only direct satellite broadcaster in Israel, which provides the Cable and
Satellite's Council authority to require local production quotas once the service is
provided to more than 200,000 subscribers).
222 See section III infra and notes 147, 148, and 149.
223

Otherwise they would not bother blocking them.
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explicit reason given by the government for its decision to limit
the scope of the activity of RTVi in the Media Most case, an
explanation justified by the court."' The permit given by the
Cable Council to the cable operators to remove CNN and BBC
broadcasts from their offering was never tested in court. However,
the government's decision to block all of the foreign channels in
case of a national emergency as defined by the military was
challenged in court and subsequently rejected.225 In Kirsch, the
court ruled in favor of the rights of citizens to free choice of
information sources,226 but in the case of Media Most, the court
sided with the government's position that advocated limiting
consumers' choice.227
Maintaining the cultural functions of heavily regulated
channels was undoubtedly a factor that came into play in Media
Most, even if not explicitly, the mere acceptance of the argument
that the limited capacity of the system-which is at least
questionable, if not totally outdated-provides an automatic
preference to the government's sanctioned channel and
demonstrates that assumption. 228 This was not the case in the
Kirsch decision, which followed Schnitzer 229 and Zichroni23 0 in
exemplifying the Supreme Court's traditional defense of Israel's
Jewish citizens from any attempts by the military or government to
control the freedom of information flow with regards to both
access (Schnitzer) and interpretation (Zichroni). This defense,
however, is one-dimensional and limited to "information as news"
and does not extend to "information as culture."
The court's traditional defense of citizen autonomy over
government controls is in line with its defense of the economic
viability of commercial media outlets, a parallel to the American
224 HCJ 6962/03, 10338/03 Media Most Inc. v. Cable & Satellite Council (2004),
http://elyon 1.court.gov.il/files/031750/OO3108/03003750.108.pdf.
225 HCJ 2753/03, 2791/03 Kirsch v. Chief of Staff of the Israeli Def. Forces (2003)

2, http://elyon I.court.gov.il/files/03/530/027109/03027530.109.pdf.
226

Id.

227 See HCJ 6962/03, 10338/03 Media Most Inc. v. Cable & Satellite Council
[2004] (unpublished decision on file with author), http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files/03/620
/069/v15/03069620.vl 5.pdf.
228 Id. at 9.
229

See HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor [1989] IsrSC 42(4) 617.

230

See HCJ 243/82 Zichroni v. IBA [1982] IsrSC 37(1) 757.
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tradition in which the individual and the corporate are protected. 23 1
This position was demonstrated in such rulings as Daily
Newspaper Publishers Union v. Minister of Education,232 in which
the commercial stability of the newspaper industry was seen as an
adequate reason to limit the different types of financing of IBA.
Additionally, in the "Reshet" Comm. & Prod. v. IBA 23 3 case, a
similar consideration affected the ruling in favor of commercial
over public broadcasting.
Media Most and Al Musaawa, represent a different challenge
that the court has failed to meet. The regulations backed by the
holding in the Media Most case supported a commercial channel
that serves government cultural goals against a foreign channel
that did not serve those goals.2 34

In the Reshet case, both the

commercial and public networks were licensed and culturally
obligated within Israel. 23' The Israeli Russian-language channel
was supposedly created in response to a market failure to launch a
Russian-language television channel.236 Clearly, foreign Russian
channels served the needs of the Russian speaking population
well; otherwise, they would not have attracted advertising and
would have been eliminated by the market, raising the question of
whether there was in fact a "market failure., 237 Their content,
however, was not regulated. The government favored the Israeli
Russian language channel, committed to its interpretation of
events and its cultural message, and the court never asked why a
local commercial channel should enjoy a monopoly limiting both
231 For a critique on the importation of American legal constructions into Israeli
court decisions on communication law see Amit Schejter, The FairnessDoctrine Is Dead
and Living in Israel, 51 FED. COMM. L. J. 281, 300 (1999).
232 See HCJ 757/84. [1984] IsrSC 41(4) 337, http://www.rashut2.org.iI/editor
/UpLoadLow/00005112.pdf.

233 HCJ 6032/94 "Reshet" Comm. & Prod. v. IBA [1994] IsrSC 51(2) 790,
http://www.rashut2.org.il/editor/UpLoadLow/jscj603294.rtf.
234 See HCJ 6962/03, 10338/03 Media Most Inc. v, Cable & Satellite Council

[2004] (unpublished decision on file with author), http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files
/03/620/069/v 15/03069620.v15.pdf.
235 See HCJ 6032/94 "Reshet" Comm. & Prod. v. IBA [1994] IsrSC 51(2) 790,

http://www.rashut2.org.il/editor/UpLoadLow/j scj603294.rtf.
236 See HCJ 7200/02 DBS Satellite Services. v. Cable & Satellite Council [2005] 2,
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/02/000/072/s12/02072000.sl 2.pdf.

237 This assumption is based on the economics of broadcasting.
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commercial and cultural diversity for Russian-speaking
immigrants.
Furthermore, in the Al Musaawa ruling, the court failed
to recognize the constraints imposed on the free flow of
information to Palestinian-Israelis, not looking beyond the deeply
rooted depiction of this minority as enemies.238 However, the
government made no attempt to block interpretations of the
Palestinian uprising or of the Iraq invasion that originated in
Arab countries, such as Al Jazeera, and they were re-transmitted
on cable while cooperating with the cable operators in blocking
CNN and BBC, whose broadcasts it saw as misrepresenting
the political conflict.2 3 9 The audiences for the Arabic broadcasts
are predominantly the Arabic speaking Palestinian-Israelis,
themselves perceived as enemies.24 ° This minority, which has no
public television channel of its own in Israel, remains exposed to
Israeli government propaganda on the one hand, and over-theborder propaganda, on the other, the attitude being "let the best
propagandist win." This is but one example of how this minority
is pushed aside and how its absorption into the Jewish majority is
far lower on the government's agenda than the absorption of
Jewish immigrants. Identifying these preferences of the political
establishment, regardless of party affiliation, in policies that seem
at first sight to be unrelated to the issues they demonstrate is also
further proof of the usefulness of the methodology chosen to
uncover the underlying beliefs of Israeli policymakers.24 '
The fact that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
government continues to cling to policies that some may argue
were justifiable in Israel's formative years, shows that nothing in
its underlying value system has changed, despite the tremendous
advances in technology over time that allow for more choice in
238 HCJ 375/03 Musawa Ctr. for the Rights of Arab Citizens of Isr. v. Prime
Minister [2004] (unpublished decision on file with author), http://elyonl.court.gov.il
/files/03/750/003/108/03003750.108.pdf. This was well described in the Orr Commission
Report. See Orr Report, supra note 108.
239 See infra Section 2.1.2.

240 See Avraham, supra note 209.
241 During all of these events a constant change in ruling party dominance
characterized Israeli politics. See THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL, 1999 (Asher Arian &
Michal Shamir 2002); THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL, 2003 (Asher Arian & Michal Shamir
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media fare and less paternalistic control of media content.
IV. Conclusion
This study demonstrates how over the course of four decades
the regulation of transfrontier broadcasting emerged out of a desire
to mold and protect an Israeli culture from foreign influence. The
Israeli government tried to limit the exposure of its citizens to
foreign television signals but has not been able to move ahead
with the times, despite changes in technology that had made such
limitations ineffective and unjustifiable. It demonstrates how the
underlying assumption of media policymaking in Israel, where the
state has the right to control the flow of information in order to
advance its prescribed view of society and its values, has served as
the cornerstone for policy measures that outlawed terrestrial
television broadcasting from ships, the re-transmission of satellite
signals "converted" to meet local commercial needs, and
"converted" channels that threatened the government's absorption
plan for immigrant groups, as well as attempted to block
information on foreign channels regarding security issues. By
providing Palestinian-Israelis with only two electronic media
alternatives-an Israeli channel targeting enemy states and
channels originating in enemy countries-the same regulatory
system continues to convey the message that this minority group is
an enemy, albeit a weak and gullible one, and seems to reinforce
an underlying assumption of policymakers in all walks of life.242
Government controls of information and culture through media
regulation were maintained in a system that proclaimed itself, and
was often described by others, as open and democratic. Even
today, policymakers in Israel believe they have the right to
regulate the flow of news. No less disturbing is the fact that the
courts, as this study shows, have at times taken the policymakers'
side, unable to dodge an underlying belief that the media have a
role in advancing government concepts of culture in which
minorities are seen as either gullible targets or straightforward
enemies.
From an analysis of one particular aspect of
broadcasting, a pattern emerges of a system inherently closed that
has yet to prove it has internalized the meaning and importance of
the free flow of communication, information, and culture in a
242

See Avraham, supra note 209.
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democratic society and the equal treatment and rights of
minorities.
The Moabite prophet Balak's mission, as defined by his patron
Bilam during biblical times, was to curse the Israelites.24 3 Instead
he found their isolationist nature worthy of blessing. 244 Insofar as
media policy is concerned, his blessing may have come back to
haunt them.

243
244

Numbers 23.
Id.

